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AbsTrACT
Millions of human biological samples are stored 
worldwide for medical research or treatment purposes. 
These biospecimens are of enormous potential value 
to law enforcement as DNA profiles can be obtained 
from these samples. However, forensic use of such 
biospecimens raises a number of ethical questions. 
This article aims to explore ethical issues of using 
human bodily material in medical biobanks for crime 
investigation and prosecution purposes. Concerns about 
confidentiality, trust, autonomy and justice will be 
discussed. We explore how to balance these concerns 
against the importance of crime solving. Relevant case 
examples of forensic use of medical biobanks show that 
requests by law enforcement to access biobanks are 
handled in disparate ways. We identify some core ethical 
issues and conclude that further research on these issues 
is needed to provide ethical guidance.
bACkground
When a patient visits a physician and bodily mate-
rial is obtained, the samples are usually stored 
for possible further use in the future. In the USA, 
human biological material of at least 178 million 
individuals is kept, estimated to increase by 20 
million per year.1 Also in Europe, biobanks house 
enormous amounts of biospecimens, such as the 
joint European BBMRI Biobank, accommodating 
more than 100 million human samples.2 In the 
field of medicine, samples are routinely stored for 
research and/or treatment purposes, and include 
every possible bodily material, such as bone tissue, 
tumour samples, blood or sperm. A wide variety 
of medical biobanks exists; some are population 
biobanks for grand- scale research, others may entail 
small collections of rare tumour tissue.
One can easily imagine the potential value of 
these immense numbers of biospecimens for law 
enforcement; DNA profiles can be obtained from 
these samples which can be compared with DNA 
profiles obtained from a crime scene and, in turn, 
can be used for criminal investigation and prosecu-
tion purposes. Indeed, in various countries, medical 
biobanks have been accessed over the years for crim-
inal investigation purposes, often in high- profile 
cases.3–5 A striking example is a criminal investi-
gation that took place in 2003 in the aftermath of 
the assassination of Anna Lindh, the then foreign 
minister of Sweden.6 Lindh was stabbed multiple 
times in the chest and abdomen while shopping 
in a department store in Stockholm. She died in 
hospital the next morning while the assaulter was 
still missing. After authorities failed to match the 
DNA found at the crime scene with samples in the 
country’s forensic genetic database, police officers 
went to the Huddinge University Hospital, which 
houses a large newborn blood sample database. 
This biobank, used to screen newborns for heredi-
tary diseases, stored approximately 3 million blood 
samples at the time, comprising almost half of the 
Swedish population.6 The chief public prosecutor 
requested the blood sample of Mijailo Mijailovic, 
a prime suspect in the murder case. The hospital 
provided the sample and soon a match was found 
between the DNA profile obtained from this sample 
and the DNA profile obtained from the murder 
weapon. Mr Mijailovic was arrested and sentenced 
to life imprisonment.7
It is unknown precisely how often law enforce-
ment requests or obtains bodily material from 
medical biobanks, although it plausibly occurs 
infrequently. However, it is clear that over the 
years, forensic use (and attempted use) of medical 
biobanks has occurred several times.3–5 Surprisingly, 
even though the ethics of forensic use of direct- to- 
consumer (DTC) genealogy databases has recently 
received much attention in the aftermath of the 
‘Golden State Killer’ arrest in 2018,8 9 forensic use 
of medical biobanks (FUB) has only been scarcely 
addressed in the ethical literature. There is exten-
sive literature on the ethics of medical biobanks,10 11 
the ethics of forensic genetic databases,12 as well as 
literature that critically questions the division (and 
examines possible flows) between those two.13 14 
However, we believe that a separate ethical discus-
sion of FUB is much needed, because FUB itself 
literally crosses the boundaries between both types 
of genetic databases.
Moreover, it is important to have an ethical 
debate—and preferably ethical guidance—about 
this issue, especially because in the future FUB 
might occur more frequently, as technological 
advancements evolve rapidly. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, a draft bill has been proposed that 
aims to specifically permit FUB. We think it is 
essential that the issue is not solely discussed from 
a legal perspective, but also from a bioethical one, 
as medical professionals and institutions might be 
directly confronted with these issues. Also, ethical 
guidance might influence policy decisions, and ulti-
mately legislation.
This article is the first article to offer a broad 
overview of the ethical issues related to using 
human bodily material in medical biobanks for 
crime investigation and/or prosecution purposes.i It 
i This article explicitly does not focus on forensic 
genetic databases (set up for crime investigation 
purposes). Also, FUB in the context of (disaster) 
victim identification is beyond the scope of this 
article.
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Table 1 Cases of (attempted) use of human biological material stored within a medical setting for the criminal investigation or prosecution of a 
suspect
Year Country Crime reason for access Access kind of bodily material
1997 Australia Incest Evidence of incest through paternal 
testing
Yes Blood (Guthrie card)
2001 UK Knowingly passing HIV Evidence of HIV infection of suspect Yes Blood or blood results (not known which of the 
two)
2003 Sweden Murder Identification suspect Yes Blood (Guthrie card)
2004 USA Murder (multiple) Identification suspect (via daughter) Yes Cervical cell material (Pap smear) from suspect’s 
daughter
2005 Italy and France Murder (multiple) Identification suspect Yes (of two individuals) Tissue sample (most likely prostate tissue) and 
tissue sample from suspect’s brother
2005 Norway Bank robbery, murder Identification (deceased) suspect No (Supreme Court ruling) Unknown
2009 Sweden Murder, dismemberment Identification (deceased) suspect No (Court of Appeal ruling) Cytological sample or tissue sample
2015 The Netherlands Attempted murder Identification suspect (through 
identification of the child)
No Blood (Guthrie card) linked to personal details
draws on the existing literature concerning FUB and informed 
consent,3 FUB from a legal perspective15 16 and the comparison 
with general forensic genetic databases.12 17 First, the strongly 
related concepts of confidentiality and trust will be discussed 
in the context of FUB. Confidentiality and trust are closely 
connected to the privacy rights of the patient, and are, as such, at 
the core of this ethical debate. Next, the principles of autonomy 
and justice, two relevant core principles of bioethics,18 will be 
examined.ii In that process, several important case examples of 
FUB are used to reflect further on these issues. Finally, it will be 
explored how the impact on confidentiality, trust, autonomy and 
justice can be balanced against the importance of crime solving. 
This paper will present an international overview of publicly 
known case examples of the use of medical biobanks for crim-
inal investigation purposes. As such, it provides the most exten-
sive overview so far of case examples of FUB. It will become 
clear that requests by law enforcement to access biobanks are 
handled in disparate ways. We identify some core ethical issues 
and conclude that further research on these issues is needed to 
provide ethical guidance.
EThiCAl issuEs To ConsidEr rEgArding Fub
Confidentiality
Perhaps the most important issue that should be taken into 
account when discussing FUB is confidentiality. The justifi-
cation of confidentiality can be made by relying on either a 
consequentialist or deontological line of argumentation. From 
a consequentialist perspective, the main problem is that an 
abandonment of confidentiality may damage the trust rela-
tionship between doctor and patient. From this perspective, 
not maintaining confidentiality might, for example, lead to 
people avoiding care or not disclosing relevant medical infor-
mation to their physicians. This, in turn, can lead to a wrong 
diagnosis, inefficient treatment or public health risks, which 
might ultimately result in more harm than keeping confiden-
tiality. According to the deontological perspective, one should 
maintain confidentiality because that is one’s duty, irrespective 
of the consequences. A deontological argument might be based 
ii Beneficence and non- maleficence will not be discussed, because 
FUB does not involve a biomedical intervention.
on respect for the patient’s autonomy, privacy or a promise- 
keeping of maintaining trust.19 20
Furthermore, confidentiality is closely related to the concept 
of privacy. Privacy implies a ‘separateness from others’ and can 
be divided into two spheres: spatial privacy, which concerns 
non- access to one’s physical or psychological integrity, and infor-
mational privacy.21 Informational privacy is ‘a state in which 
personal information about an individual is in a state of non- 
access from others’.21 Confidentiality can be seen as a branch 
of informational privacy.22 Privacy and confidentiality are not 
synonyms. Confidentiality does not only entail protection of 
one’s personal information, but also protection of a relation-
ship.21 With respect to medical confidentiality, this concerns the 
physician–patient relationship.
As already indicated, central to respecting medical confiden-
tiality is the accessibility of healthcare; everyone must be able 
to have non- restrictive access to professional medical help. 
Medical confidentiality thus aims to protect both the individual 
patient as well as society as a whole. The importance of confi-
dentiality is reflected in numerous professional guidelines, in 
which it is considered a prima facie value. However, both the 
consequentialist and the deontological perspectives on medical 
confidentiality hold that under certain circumstances, excep-
tions to confidentiality are possible. From a consequentialist 
perspective, there might be cases in which maintaining confi-
dentiality might result in more harm than breaching confidenti-
ality, for example, when a physician might prevent a murder by 
disclosing her patient’s plans. Within such a decision, all rele-
vant consequences should be taken into account, including the 
consequences for the patient, the public and the societal interest. 
From a deontological perspective, confidentiality is in general 
regarded as a non- absolute duty.18 19 21 Interestingly, the debate 
regarding confidentiality in the context of crime has tradition-
ally focused on a possibility to breach confidentiality in the case 
of crime prevention, not for criminal investigation or prosecu-
tion purposes.
The tension between medical confidentiality and crime solving 
can be recognised in some case examples of FUB. One of them is 
the notorious ‘BTK case’ (for an overview of cases, see table 1). In 
this case, US police forces had tried for a long timeto track down 
a serial killer, but he could not be found. The unknown assailant, 
who murdered at least 10 people between 1974 and 1991, nick-
named himself BTK—‘Bind Torture Kill’—in the many letters 
he sent over the years to newspapers and authorities. Decades 








thics: first published as 10.1136/m




3de Groot NF, et al. J Med Ethics 2020;0:1–8. doi:10.1136/medethics-2020-106133
Extended essay
later, a man called Dennis Rader was named as a suspect, but law 
enforcement did not have enough evidence to prosecute him.5 
Therefore, law enforcement decided to seize cervical cell mate-
rial of Rader's daughter, kept in a university clinic, in order to 
compare it with DNA found at the murder scenes.5 23 A partial 
match was found and subsequently Rader was arrested and 
convicted. He is currently serving a life sentence.
In this case example, the issue of confidentiality is perhaps 
even more important because it involves the bodily material of 
a family member of a suspect and not of the suspect himself. 
It can be argued that the informational privacy of the daugh-
ter’s medical conditions is violated, as the kind of seized tissue 
sample already discloses a (plausible) medical condition; in this 
case, a Pap smear for cervical cancer screening. Indeed, this is a 
major issue when considering FUB: the bodily material stored in 
biobanks in itself constitutes very sensitive information. Based 
on the type of stored bodily material, one could infer the plau-
sible medical condition of the donor. Whether the stored tissue 
would be a breast tumour, uterine fibroids or sperm, the material 
reveals a likely condition; breast cancer, myomata and subfer-
tility, respectively. Although this information is not of direct 
interest to law enforcement, it can be regarded as an inevitable 
‘bycatch’—of a highly confidential nature. In addition to the 
sensitive nature of the type of bodily material, a broad variety 
of sensitive information can be derived from this material, such 
as parental links, genetic ancestry, (predisposition to) heredi-
tary diseases, as well as information about someone’s physical 
appearance, such as hair colour.24 Furthermore, the physician–
patient relationship between the daughter and her physician in 
the clinic might be damaged as she did not expect that her tissue 
material would be used to implicate her father. Thus, it is also a 
matter of medical confidentiality.
Correspondingly, empirical research suggests that people are 
concerned about confidentiality issues in the context of FUB. A 
US survey of 4659 possible participants of a biobank showed 
that 75% of participants were concerned about the ‘govern-
ment having their samples and information’.25 In addition, 84% 
of participants stated that they found it ‘important to have a 
law protecting research information from law- enforcement 
officials’.25
Like in the BTK case, another case also involved a family 
member. In Italy, police had tried to find for decades the chief 
of the Sicilian Mafia, Bernardo Provenzano. In 2005, the police 
still had no idea whether the notorious criminal was fugitive or 
had already died, until they received information that he had 
got himself treated for prostate cancer under a false name in a 
French hospital a few years earlier.26 Police seized the hospital 
tissues of this ‘pseudonym’ and made a DNA profile, which they 
then successfully matched with Provenzano’s brothers’ DNA. 
Interestingly, they obtained this DNA from a blood sample of 
Provenzano’s brother stored in a hospital in Palermo where his 
brother had undergone surgery.26 The police now knew that 
Provenzano was most likely still alive and the search for him 
intensified. Eventually, he could be captured.
In contrast to the above- described cases, there are at least three 
case examples in which FUB was attempted by law enforcement 
but did not succeed because it was refused on the basis of medical 
confidentiality. The first one concerns a robbery case in Norway. 
In 2004, one of the largest bank robberies in the country’s 
history took place in the city of Stavanger. In the violent armed 
raid, one police officer was killed. After an extensive investiga-
tion, it turned out that one of the prime suspects had died of 
cancer a few months after the robbery.27 The police requested 
access to tissue samples of the deceased that were stored at the 
Aker University Hospital in order to compare them with DNA 
samples found at the crime scene. However, the hospital refused 
to provide the samples on the basis of confidentiality. The 
Norwegian Supreme Court, eventually, ruled in favour of the 
hospital’s decision.28 In its ruling, the Court stressed the impor-
tance of the right to privacy in these kinds of issues, both before 
and after death, because human bodily material can provide 
information about the person’s genes, diseases and other charac-
teristics ‘now, and in the future’.28 The court, thus, focused on 
its ruling on the notion of informational privacy.
The second example involves another Swedish case. In 2009, 
Swedish police attempted to solve a cold case murder. Twenty- 
eight- year- old Catrine da Costa had been killed and dismem-
bered in 1984. Several body parts were found in garbage bags 
on different locations, although her head, one breast and geni-
tals remained missing. Forensic investigation of the site where 
the bags were found led to the securing of some hairs of the 
alleged killer.29 As DNA from the two main suspects in the case, 
a pathologist and a general practitioner, did not match with 
DNA from these hair strands, police turned to another suspect. 
This man, a butcher who had previously been convicted for 
murder and dismemberment, had, however, died in 1987. The 
Pathology and Cytology Department of the Huddinge Hospital 
stored tissue samples of the deceased suspect and these samples 
were requested by the public prosecutor.29 30 When the hospital 
refused to hand over the tissue samples, the case went to court. 
The District Court of Södertörn initially permitted access to the 
tissue samples, but the Svea Court of Appeal annulled this deci-
sion.29 Consequently, the tissue samples were never used.
A third case occurred in the Netherlands in 2015. In 
Amsterdam, a newborn of only a few days old had been left 
in an underground garbage container. As the container was full 
of trash, the newborn survived the fall into the container and 
was discovered by a passer- by. When attempts to track down 
the parents of the baby failed, the public prosecutor requested 
the Guthrie card of the baby, a blood sample used to screen for 
hereditary diseases. As the blood sample is linked to the personal 
information of the child, the prosecution intended to identify 
the parents through this specimen. However, the National Insti-
tute for Public Health, which stored the newborn blood samples, 
denied access on the basis of their medical confidentiality.
In some countries, legislation is in force that explicitly 
prohibits FUB, mostly based on arguments about protecting 
confidentiality. For example, both Finland and Estonia have a 
clear policy in this regard. Estonia, housing one of the largest 
biobanks in Europe,31 established the Human Genes Research 
Act, which states clearly that the ‘[u]se of the Gene Bank for 
other purposes, especially to collect evidence in civil or crim-
inal proceedings or for surveillance, is prohibited’.32 Similarly, 
Finland has laid down the prohibition of using medical biobanks 
for crime investigation purposes in its 2012 Biobank Act.33
In contrast, in the Netherlands, a proposal for a Dutch Human 
Tissue Act was presented in 2017 which includes an article 
that would allow FUB for the investigation and prosecution of 
serious crimes.34 The draft bill states that in balancing the inter-
ests of investigating and prosecuting crimes on the one hand, 
and access to healthcare on the other hand, there are exceptional 
circumstances in which truth finding and prosecution of crimes 
are considered as more important than protecting medical confi-
dentiality. It is argued that this is the case when, among other 
things, the crime is very serious, such as murder or rape. The 
severity of the crime thus plays an important role.
In sum, the notion of confidentiality is at the core of the ethical 
debate regarding FUB. As we have seen in the case examples, 
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confidentiality is not limited to a living suspect’s bodily material, 
but also to that of a deceased suspect. The different case exam-
ples of FUB have shown that there are profound differences in 
how confidentiality and crime solving are balanced against one 
another. An important factor is whether one takes a more deon-
tological or consequentialist viewpoint. This issue will be further 
explored in the Discussion section.
Trust
Trust is highly valued in medical practice and is closely related 
to confidentiality. The notion of trust has been widely debated 
and various definitions have been proposed.35 36 In several 
accounts of trusts, the concept of vulnerability is central; within 
the physician–patient relationship, often sensitive information is 
being confided by the patient, which leads to the patient having 
a vulnerable position in this regard.
Trust also entails entrusting; Baier’s theory of trust includes the 
notion that a person—with accepted vulnerability—entrusts to 
another individual, a thing X, that is of value to her.35 According 
to Hall’s conceptualisation of trust, it is crucial that there is ‘opti-
mistic acceptance’ of vulnerability, with positive expectations, 
and not solely trusting behaviour.36 Thus, it is not necessarily the 
case that an individual who seeks care should automatically be 
considered to have some degree of trust.36 For example, consider 
a country in which a fugitive criminal, severely wounded after 
being shot by a police officer, visits a physician for professional 
medical treatment, although he is aware that every doctor in the 
country will immediately report him to the authorities and he 
will face a lifelong prison sentence. In this case, we can hardly 
say that the criminal is trusting the physician; it is merely a 
matter of inevitable death versus a prison sentence. The act of 
the criminal visiting the physician does not constitute trust, since 
although the criminal is vulnerable, he does not have an opti-
mistic acceptance of this vulnerability.
Some suggest that FUB might have a negative effect on trust.3 6 
When trust in the context of FUB is discussed from a consequen-
tialist perspective, one might argue that FUB could negatively 
affect the trust in doctors in general, thus resulting in negative 
consequences, including that some patients might refrain from 
medical care. This, in turn, could give rise to, for example, an 
outbreak of infectious diseases. A possible counterargument is 
that this future vision is framed unnecessarily catastrophic: FUB 
will only affect the trust of those suspected of severe crimes, 
which is something that could be regarded as being taken for 
granted as it will only apply to a small (criminal) portion of the 
population. However, it is quite likely that these individuals 
would then avoid medical help out of fear they will be charged 
for their crimes. Would we be willing to accept such a conse-
quence? One might argue that even if we would make the radical 
claim that a person who has committed a horrendous crime has 
no right to live, it is hard to accept him or her dying in tremen-
dous pains without any professional medical help. Moreover, 
refraining from seeking medical care may not only apply to crim-
inals; FUB might also deter other patients, who could reason 
that, somehow, in the future they may be sought by the police 
(because who knows which path life or politics will follow). 
Perhaps this is more likely in patients who already encounter 
symptoms of anxiety or paranoia.
FUB might not only affect the trust in medical professionals 
and institutions, but also that in medical research in general. 
It has been argued that a fundamental part of public trust in 
biomedical genetic research depends on research participants 
and patients knowing that third- party access to their sensi-
tive information is strictly prohibited.37 There are also some 
indications that FUB may affect the trust of the general public. 
For example, in the Anna Lindh assassination case, the debate 
about the question whether it was justified to obtain the blood 
sample of the suspect from the newborn blood biobank mainly 
revolved around the issues of confidentiality and trust. Some 
argued that the biobank should not be accessible for crime inves-
tigation purposes, because it is a matter of maintaining public 
trust.6 In contrast, one of the members of the Swedish National 
Board of Health and Welfare claimed that it would not affect the 
public trust nor the willingness of parents to have their newborn 
screened: ‘I do not believe that parents see their own child as a 
future murderer.’6 She proposed to make it possible by legisla-
tion to allow FUB in the case of severe crimes and stated that 
‘we cannot have murderers (…) walking around in the streets’.6 
In this respect, it is of interest that in the year following the 
assassination of Lindh, 445 Swedes asked for the destruction of 
their tissue samples stored in the biobank, compared with only 
17 requests up until 2003.6 Likewise, in the aftermath of another 
case, much more blood samples were destroyed; in Australia, 
police seized multiple Guthrie blood samples of children during 
an investigation into alleged incest, in order to examine who was 
the father of these children.38 A police officer went to the Perth 
hospital with a search warrant and received the blood samples.38 
The case evoked extensive media attention and public discus-
sion which led to the destruction of all Guthrie cards in Western 
Australia older than 2 years.39
With respect to trust, another important distinction can be 
made; that between trust and trustworthiness.36 Although they 
often go together, this is not necessarily the case. On the one 
hand, patients can trust physicians (or medical institutions) who 
in fact must not be trusted, and on the other hand, patients 
can mistrust trustworthy physicians. An interesting case in this 
respect is the Stephen Kelly case. In 2001, Kelly was charged 
for knowingly transmitting the HIV to his former girlfriend 
by sexual intercourse. For a conviction, the public prosecutor 
needed evidence that the suspect knew he was infected with 
HIV at the moment he met his girlfriend.4 Therefore, the pros-
ecutor requested access to a blood HIV test that the suspect had 
previously undergone. Kelly had himself tested as part of an HIV 
research programme in Glenochil Prison, where he was detained 
at the time. The research was set up because of heroin needle 
sharing in the prison. Later, a molecular research programme 
showed that a woman (who later turned out to be Kelly’s former 
girlfriend) had the same HIV strain as the Glenochil Prison virus 
strain.40 Backed by a court order, the prosecution obtained the 
HIV blood test and Stephen Kelly was convicted with 5 years of 
imprisonment. In this case, Kelly had trusted the researchers of 
the HIV programme that his HIV status would be kept confi-
dential and anonymous; Kelly’s HIV status could be regarded 
as a ‘valued thing X’, according to Baier’s conceptualisation of 
trust. Disclosing the HIV status of Kelly might be regarded as 
an example of an individual trusting the researcher, while at 
the same time the trustworthiness can be questioned. Professor 
Brown, who was responsible for the HIV research programme, 
stated: ‘The thing that concerned me was that these samples 
were presented as part of a bona fide research programme and 
in confidence, and I was frankly appalled when this information 
was pulled out as part of this investigation, and there seemed to 
be nothing I could do about it.’4 He added: ‘As far as my own 
research is concerned, I wouldn’t touch another molecular epide-
miology investigation in Scotland unless there is some clarifica-
tion of whether this seizure of material is or is not appropriate.’4
There is also some empirical evidence which supports the 
theory that FUB might have a negative impact on trust. A US 
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study investigated the perceptions and attitudes of (future) 
research participants about genome- wide association studies in 
10 focus groups.41 In every session of this study, distrust was 
expressed about the possibilities of the federal government 
to access research data for purposes other than research. The 
participants had two main concerns. The first was ‘the potential 
for inappropriate use of data by law enforcement or national 
security agencies’ and the second ‘the possibility of a “tyrannical 
government” using such data for eugenics or other objectionable 
purposes’.41 One participant said: ‘I would trust researchers, but 
I don’t trust the insurance industry, and I don’t trust the govern-
ment’41 (p 92).
Another study also showed an impact on trust. A global survey 
of almost 9000 adults from the USA, UK, Canada and Australia 
asked participants about their attitudes and opinions regarding 
large genomic data sets and the donation of one’s personal data.42 
32.2% of participants indicated that they were concerned about 
the ‘government potentially knowing something about me that I 
hadn’t chosen to tell them’42 and 18.2% were concerned about 
the police knowing something about them without their consent. 
The study also looked into the differences between the people 
who were willing to donate their DNA and medical informa-
tion, and those who were not willing. Remarkably, there is not a 
very large difference between the group willing and unwilling to 
give their DNA when it comes to their concerns about the police 
knowing something: 17.2% and 23.8%, respectively. Interest-
ingly, also 4050 participants (45.2%) stated that they were afraid 
their DNA would be copied and planted at a crime scene.42
By contrast, there is one study which suggests FUB will only 
marginally affect trust. In this study by Bexelius et al,43 810 inhab-
itants of Stockholm responded to a questionnaire. A majority of 
the respondents (88.1%) regarded it as acceptable for the police 
to gain access to genetic samples stored for healthcare purposes. 
Only 6.3% of participants indicated that this practice would 
have a negative impact on their trust. It is unclear whether these 
numbers are representative of a broader population. It should 
be noted that trust in government is relatively high in Sweden 
compared with other countries.
In conclusion, there are clear indications that FUB has a nega-
tive effect on trust, although the empirical evidence is too limited 
to estimate the size of the impact. Still, one could argue that 
even if the effects on patients’ trust were very limited, FUB could 
still be ethically problematic on deontological grounds. For the 
debate on FUB, it is therefore important to address the principle 
of trust not solely from a consequentialist perspective. A deon-
tological argument might put a greater emphasis on the value of 
trust in itself. Confidentiality and trust are thousands- year- old 
cornerstones of the physician–patient relationship. Constantine 
the African wrote around 1100 AD that a physician ‘ought to 
keep to himself confidential information concerning the ailment, 
for at times the patient makes known to the physician things that 
he would blush to tell his parents’.44
Autonomy
Respect for patient’s autonomy is a core principle of biomedical 
ethics, that is mainly operationalised through the requirement of 
informed consent.45 In the context of FUB, one could argue that 
FUB cannot be justified, because no informed consent has been 
given for this usage. Indeed, it is highly plausible that in all of the 
above- described cases, the suspects were not aware their tissues 
could be used for forensic objectives, not to mention they had 
given consent for this.
There are even some criminal justice cases in which people have 
explicitly stated they did not want to give their bodily material 
to the authorities, and because of this reason, law enforcement 
decided to obtain the biological samples from a medical context. 
An example of this is the aforementioned Australian incest case; 
the police seized the Guthrie blood samples of children after their 
mother had refused to give permission to obtain blood directly 
from the children.38 In this case, the mother of the children (and 
daughter of the suspect) explicitly refused to give consent. In 
the BTK killer case, too, there was no informed consent given 
by the suspect’s daughter to obtain her cervical cell material. 
The police simply bypassed the daughter in the process. There 
could also be cases in which bodily material is obtained by law 
enforcement, but the person from whom the material is taken, 
and who had not given consent, turns out to be innocent; in that 
case, the harm that resulted from this should be weighed against 
the importance to potentially solve a crime.
With respect to a deceased suspect, it is obviously not possible 
to obtain informed consent, but still—as does apply to all the 
other cases—one cannot assume consent either. In the case of 
identification of a victim, rather than that of a suspect, this 
is different; in the case of victims, usually we can reasonably 
assume that the victim of a murder would have been wanted to 
be identified.
In all of the described cases in this article (see table 1), no 
informed consent was given by those concerned to access the 
bodily material. It has been argued that—when it is not possible 
to legally forbid relevant types of FUB—the second- best option 
is to limit FUB as much as possible, and, in addition, to inform 
the donors of bodily material about the possibility of forensic 
use.3
One might argue that a system could be developed in which 
informed consent about FUB is asked from anyone whose mate-
rial is stored, which would make it justified to forensically use 
the material. However, this proposal is problematic. First of all, 
given the millions of tissue samples stored around the globe, 
it is simply infeasible to seek informed consent from everyone 
involved. Even if it were practically possible, it would take a lot 
of time and effort, and obstruct important biomedical research. 
However, perhaps the most important argument against imple-
menting informed consent is that criminals can simply opt out 
and have their tissue samples destroyed. Thus, it will simply not 
be beneficial for the initial aim: the prosecution and investiga-
tion of crimes.
Justice
Finally, we briefly consider justice; another core principle of 
biomedical ethics.18 With respect to the context of FUB, there 
might be at least two concerns regarding justice. They are both 
related to the concept of equality, which is a central component 
to almost all theories of justice. It dates back to Aristotle and 
entails that all equals should be treated equally and all unequals 
should be treated unequally.18 In the context of FUB, the issue 
of equality concerns the individuals whose bodily material is 
stored in medical biobanks versus the individuals whose material 
is not stored in such biobanks. In many biospecimen archives in 
hospitals, the proportion of ill individuals is over- represented 
compared with healthy individuals. Therefore, giving police 
access to these biobanks will target ill individuals disproportion-
ally; their material is more likely to be stored in such medical 
biobanks (which renders them more vulnerable for prosecution). 
Thus, individuals who are ill are treated in a different way than 
individuals who are not. In any case, they have a higher risk to 
be arrested. It does not seem fair that the criminal justice system 
could target ill people more than healthy people. The chance of 
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being prosecuted should not depend on whether or not one’s 
kidney tumour is stored in a hospital’s basement.
Second, as health problems are related to poverty,46 allowing 
FUB might also disproportionately affect poor people, who are 
already under a greater risk to be targeted by police inquiries. 
There is, thus, a potential twofold inequality for ill individuals: 
first, the unequal risk of investigation and prosecution, and, 
second (but related), the unequal risk for poor people. In sum, 
there might be a problem with respect to the so- called distributive 
justice, which refers to the fair and equal distribution of respon-
sibilities, rights and burdens within a society.18 After the murder 
case of Anna Lindh, the Swedish Minister of Health declared that 
biobanks ‘should only be used for research purposes. They are 
not police records, nor a register for social problems’.6 Notably, 
the—controversial—population- wide genetic forensic database 
has far fewer problems with equality and distributive justice in 
comparison to FUB; as all citizens are in the database, there are 
almost no ethical problems from the perspective of equality.
Could individuals avoid these injustices? To some extent, an ill 
criminal might avoid going to the doctor for mild health issues, 
such as a cough, and thus prevent bodily material being taken 
and stored. But for more severe, life- threatening conditions, this 
does not seem to be feasible, as staying alive will often be an 
over- riding value for people. Second, requesting that your bodily 
material will be destroyed after it has been stored does not 
appear to be a (perfect) solution to the inequality—and there-
fore injustice—either. When individuals request their biological 
samples to be destroyed, this might draw the attention of law 
enforcement. Indeed, this is not as unlikely as it may seem, as 
a Swedish crime investigation has demonstrated. In that case, 
an extensive police investigation of nine sexual assaults showed 
that these offences were committed by the same man. However, 
the identity of this man, known in the media as ‘Hagamannen’, 
was not known. Therefore, police requested access to names 
and social security numbers from persons who had requested 
the destruction of their blood samples stored in the newborn 
screening blood database (which multiple people had done in the 
aftermath of the public outcry resulting from the biobank access 
in the Lindh case)—which was refused.30
To conclude, FUB might also result in issues regarding justice, 
mostly with respect to inequality and distributive justice.
disCussion
We have discussed FUB from an ethical perspective, focusing on 
confidentiality, trust, autonomy and justice. The possible nega-
tive effects with respect to confidentiality, trust, autonomy and 
justice could be considered in light of possible criminal justice 
benefits. By attempting to balance ethical harms and criminal 
justice benefits, two issues are crucial: (1) whether there are 
alternatives to FUB, and (2) the urgency to solve the crime.
Before discussing these two issues, it should be noted that 
in many cases FUB will not be useful to solve a crime in the 
first place. This is because—for now at least—medical biobanks 
are not organised in a way that one can simply scan through 
an entire biobank to compare a DNA profile of a crime scene 
(in contrast to forensic genetic databases). Therefore, police will 
already need to have a suspect in view (an exception is the case 
in which they asked the names of those who had their speci-
mens destroyed). When the suspect is known—and this brings 
us to the first point—often there are multiple good alternatives 
to obtain a DNA sample, such as obtaining it from a toothbrush, 
a discarded coffee cup or through familial testing. It might, for 
example, have been possible to find a discarded cigarette butt of 
the BTK suspect rather than accessing his daughter’s Pap smear.
However, there will also be cases in which there is simply 
no alternative other than obtaining the medical tissue sample 
to provide the unequivocal evidence. An interesting case in this 
respect is that of Stephen Kelly (see the Trust section). Here, it is 
clear that there is no alternative evidence available to prove the 
suspect was already infected with HIV, other than obtaining the 
blood results from the HIV test.
The issue of alternatives is also relevant in the case of a deceased 
suspect. Regarding the Norwegian bank robbery, the suspect had 
already died of cancer before he came into the picture of law 
enforcement. Although it is unknown whether the suspect was 
cremated or buried after death, one might argue that—when we 
assume the man was cremated (and thus exhuming a body is 
not possible) and no DNA could be obtained from his former 
home—there is no alternative to obtaining the suspect’s DNA 
other than accessing his tissue samples stored in the hospital 
where he received cancer treatment. The same applies to the 
Swedish suspect of the murder and dismemberment of Catrine 
da Costa.
Still, one could argue that even in these instances of deceased 
suspects, often alternatives do exist. For example, when a suspect 
has deceased, law enforcement might turn to parental testing of 
family members to match the DNA found at the crime scene 
(assuming that consent is given). Even when close relatives of 
the suspect have deceased too, there are possibilities to identify 
the suspect through distant relatives. With newly emerging DNA 
matching technologies, such as single- nucleotide polymorphism 
array techniques, it is possible to identify even ninth- degree 
cousins.47 Add to this the rapidly expanding use of DTC gene-
alogy databases and one might ask whether FUB might become 
largely superfluous in the near future. In the period August 2018 
to August 2019, DTC genealogy databases have been used to 
identify suspects and missing individuals in more than 50 cold 
cases.48 In addition, it has been argued that a genetic database 
needs to contain only 2% of a population to result in a third- 
degree cousin match to almost any person of the population.49 It 
has even been hypothesised that by 2021, genotypes of more than 
100 million people are in DTC databases and therefore finding 
a matching relative will become almost a complete certainty.50 
Thus, when the primary aim of the criminal investigation is the 
identification of a suspect, accessing DTC genealogy databases 
may be preferable—avoiding accessing medical material.iii When, 
however, the aim is not identification, but some other—such as 
the HIV testing of Stephen Kelly—the DTC genealogy databases 
will not be of any utility, since these databases can almost solely 
be used in the forensic setting for identification. Thus, in these 
cases accessing a medical biobank might still have a utility for 
law enforcement.
Regarding our second point, the urgency that the crime is 
solved should also be taken into account. In this context, time 
pressure is relevant; when there is a serial killer on the loose who 
kills someone every Wednesday morning, the urgency to find 
this criminal is much higher compared with a decades- old cold 
case. Although in an old case there are evidently also benefits 
that the crime is solved, primarily for the family of the victims or 
the victims themselves, there is less urgency for rapid action. As 
has been mentioned already above, breaching confidentiality is 
iii Forensic use of DTC databases plausibly entails different 
ethical considerations than FUB, for example, regarding physi-
cian–patient confidentiality, and should therefore be discussed 
in a separate paper.
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usually justified in the context of crime prevention, not the inves-
tigation or prosecution of that crime. Also in the Dutch container 
baby case, the level of urgency was considered. The National 
Institute for Public Health denied access to the newborn’s blood 
sample, because—they argued—there was no serious danger for 
the child or for others at the time. However, some people might 
argue that the ethical problems of FUB are simply outweighed by 
the importance of crime solving.
The case examples have shown that regarding the urgency to 
solve the crime, the severity of the crime plays an important role 
as well. For example, the recently proposed Dutch legislation 
only allows FUB in the case of serious crimes, such as murder 
and rape. The article states that in these serious cases using the 
bodily material for forensic purposes is ‘(…) in the interest of 
society in general and of the victims and possible relatives in 
particular’.34 This line of reasoning can also be recognised in 
the decision by the Scottish High Court in the HIV case. In the 
other FUB case examples police tend to turn to biobanks in the 
case of a horrendous and/or societal high- impact crime, such as 
the assassination of a politician, the most violent bank robbery 
in a country’s history or the cruel dismemberment of a young 
woman. It can be questioned whether there was an urgent need 
to solve these crimes with respect to the risk of recidivism, or 
that the political and social pressure plays a more predominant 
role.
In sum, regarding the question whether FUB would be 
allowed, the availability of alternatives as well as the urgency 
(time pressure and severity of the crime) may well be important 
factors. With respect to time pressure, it might be the case that 
some good alternatives to FUB are less appealing, simply because 
they would take more time. Furthermore, one might argue that 
only weighing the harms and benefits of FUB will not be suffi-
cient to explore the complete ethical debate on FUB. Indeed, 
those who take a more deontological position could argue that 
the possible negative effects of FUB with regard to confidenti-
ality, trust, autonomy and justice must lead to the conclusion 
not to permit FUB, regardless of its potential for crime solving.
ConClusion
It is important that FUB is not only approached from a legal or 
law enforcement perspective, but also from a bioethics perspec-
tive as it concerns core issues in medical ethics. Our analysis 
shows that there are pressing ethical problems related to FUB 
concerning confidentiality, trust, autonomy and justice. In addi-
tion, the case examples make clear that legal systems deal with 
FUB in disparate ways. Since this paper aims to give an overview 
of ethical issues involved, our discussion of these concepts is not 
exhaustive. Further research, focusing on each of these topics, 
is needed to provide ethical guidance and to inform the public, 
legal, social and political debate. Although FUB apparently does 
not occur frequently at the moment, rapid technological devel-
opments in the field of genetics could make it more common 
in the near future. Ultimately, the aim would be to guide policy 
decisions on how to responsibly deal with FUB and to prevent 
hasty—and possibly unwise—decisions being made in the after-
math of a societal high- impact crime. Even a small number of 
high- profile cases may have a considerable impact on people’s 
health behaviour and their perception of healthcare and its core 
values.
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